The trial court ruled that Cook's expert testimony had relied upon several documents that were not authenticated or admitted into evidence, including 1 Valley Auto Parts's QuickBooks accounting records dating from inception through , 2 Valley Auto Parts's federal tax returns from , and 3 Harris's personal tax returns from The trial court did not allow Sorg's testimony on the ground that Sorg was not timely identified as a witness, and it rejected Stumpff's argument that Sorg was a rebuttal witness.
Because Cook had no "firsthand personal knowledge of the detailed financial data used for his analysis that is contained in the documents he reviewed and relied upon, some of which are not in evidence," the trial court found that Cook's testimony fell "outside the parameters of Evid. On May 7, , the trial court entered an order of dissolution, pursuant to R. In short, Stumpff and Mahaffey's Auto Salvage argue that the exclusion of Cook's opinions that were based on the tax returns and Valley Auto Parts's business records should not have resulted in the exclusion of all of Cook's opinions.
Harris's appellate brief does not respond to this argument. Johnson, 2d Dist. The disclosure may be in response to a hypothetical question or otherwise. State ex rel. State Line Agri, Inc.
Darke No. Cook referenced those documents in his testimony regarding whether Valley Auto Parts's tax returns were consistent with that company's business records as to the source of its start-up funds. Cook stated that he agreed with the trial court's earlier-stated conclusion that Mahaffey's Auto Salvage actually funded Valley Auto Parts when it went into business. Cook further stated that, as a joint venture, Mahaffey's Auto Salvage's expenses related to its employees should have been split evenly with Valley Auto Parts.
Mahaffey's Auto Salvage paid the cost for the fence materials and Mahaffey's Auto Salvage employees provided the labor for the fence's construction. Cook's calculation of the amount owed related to the fence materials was based on Harris's prior testimony, which was of record, and Mahaffey's Auto Salvage's QuickBooks records. For example, Cook testified that he based his calculations of the amount of Mahaffey's Auto Salvage's employee-related expenses and the fence-related costs on Mahaffey's Auto Salvage's financial records, not the records that the court deemed to be unauthenticated and excluded.
Each of these calculations was a free-standing opinion, which could have been evaluated by the trial court without reference to the excluded documents. Accordingly, given that Cook rendered a series of opinions based on different documents, the trial court erred in excluding all of Cook's expert testimony due to the fact that some of the opinions were based on documents that had been excluded. Stumpff and Mahaffey's Auto Salvage assert that these documents were implicitly authenticated or, alternatively, "self-authenticated" when Harris provided them in response to a specific discovery request for these documents.
Harris states that the documents were not authenticated under Evid. Harris further states that, because the documents upon which Cook relied were not authenticated and admitted into evidence, the trial court properly excluded his testimony, in accordance with Evid. Simmons, 2d Dist. The threshold standard for authenticating evidence is low, State v. Wiley, 2d Dist. The most commonly used method is testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be under Evid. State v. Renner, 2d Dist. Self-authenticating documents do not require extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to their admissibility.
The Rule identifies ten self-authenticating documents, including, for example, domestic public documents bearing a government seal, certified copies of public records, official publications, newspapers, and acknowledged documents. The trial court expressly rejected Mahaffey's Auto Salvage's and Stumpff's argument that the "mere production of documents in discovery constitutes an authentication making the documents admissible without a sponsoring witness possessing some knowledge pertinent to authentication.
By this we mean that a party is not excused from providing evidence of authenticity for items that it received in discovery. Nevertheless, we find that that trial court erred in excluding these documents for lack of proof of authentication, because these documents could be, and were, properly authenticated by testimony that they were documents that had been specifically requested from and provided by the opposing party Harris during discovery.
Indeed, Evid. In the context of subpoenas, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the Fifth Amendment may protect an individual from complying with a subpoena for the production of his personal records in his possession because the very act of production may constitute a compulsory authentication of incriminating information. See, e. Bissell, N. Ohio No. Evangelical Ben.
Trust, S. Bruno's, Inc. Tatum, Ala.
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Swaco Geolograph Co. Wilmington Trust Co. Just as he could have identified the records by oral testimony, his very act of production was implicit authentication. Sanders , 92 Ohio St. In Sanders, the defendant was alleged to have planned and led an uprising at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility at Lucasville; a prison guard was murdered, on Sanders's orders, during the riot. During his trial on charges of aggravated murder, Sanders's counsel sought to introduce a tape recording that the FBI had made from tunnels underneath cellblock L, a "tunnel tape.
The Ohio Supreme Court noted that the trial court did not prevent Sanders from playing the tape or from commenting on whether the voices were those of Sanders and others. However, Sanders could not comment on whether the tape was "fake," because he was not an expert. Regarding authentication of the tape, the court noted,.
Emphasis added. Sanders, 92 Ohio St. The fact that Sanders had received the tape from the prosecution did not excuse Sanders from authenticating the tape see also Hasan v. Ishee, S. NEC Corp. As explained by the Supreme Court of Kentucky:. Thrasher v. The Supreme Court of Kentucky thus held that "the fact that the document was produced in discovery may give rise to an inference of authenticity where production was made by someone competent to provide authentication, but the mere fact of production does not suffice where that competence is lacking.
Suffice it to say, a trial court should consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the documents' production, including, but not limited to, the specificity of the discovery request, the nature of the documents, and the party responding to the discovery request. On June 5, , plaintiffs moved to compel discovery, including the following documents:. On September 10, , the trial court granted that motion and ordered Harris to respond to the discovery request within seven days. When Harris did not comply with that order, the trial court held a telephone conference with the parties.
In January 10, , the court awarded attorney fees as a discovery sanction. Following that conference, the trial court ordered that 1 within ten days, Harris's accountant would deliver to plaintiffs' counsel the QuickBooks discs, 2 on Thursday, February 14, , at p. In a prosecution for making an unlawful communication with a child under this statute, the Commonwealth was not required to prove completion of taking indecent liberties. The judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the defendant's conviction is affirmed. He was accorded due process in an evidentiary hearing and could be heard and present evidence, and he had counsel throughout.
The propriety of the sentence imposed and the involuntary civil commitment order are not challenged. The arguments that the ends of justice exception should be applied because the circuit court ignored the seriousness of his mental illness and should have committed defendant directly to inpatient hospitalization, making the imprisonment a manifest injustice, is rejected. The five-year prison sentence is for a crime committed before defendant's alleged temporary insanity, to which he pled guilty after recovering from that condition. Statutes do not prescribe a sequence for imposition of incarceration for one offense in relation to involuntary civil commitment for different crimes committed in a later period of temporary insanity.
Prisons are required to provide treatment, and defendant can also be transferred to a facility outside of the Department of Corrections if it is determined that he cannot be provided the kind of care required during incarceration. Thus the ends of justice exception under Rule will not be applied to review the errors alleged, and the judgments of the circuit court are affirmed. The judgment is reversed and final judgment is entered on this appeal for the city. Browntown Valley Assocs. Education Assn. The judgment is reversed and the issue of any attorney fee recovery is remanded to the circuit court.
School Board v. The test is not whether a release explicitly lists a potential future claim, but whether the parties intended to release such a claim. The judgments of the circuit court are affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the matter is remanded for calculation of the refund due to the taxpayer.
The only factor statutorily relevant to determining the adequacy of the petitioner's reason for filing the application was the reason alleged. It cannot be discerned, without evidence, whether the alleged religious conversion is sincere. In addition, plaintiff presented no evidence that a lack of disclosures by the defendant physician prevented her from making an informed decision with respect to the surgery on the part of her body to be operated on, or that she would not have elected to have the surgery in that location in the face of proper disclosures.
Without any evidence to establish proximate causation, the informed consent claim fails as a matter of law. The judgment is reversed and the action is remanded for retrial on the negligence claims. Plaintiff failed, at the summary judgment stage, to come forward with expert opinion establishing certain alleged improper statements made by the defendant doctor were a proximate cause of her alleged injuries in the form of aggravation of preexisting mental or physical conditions. The complaint is dismissed. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the gas utility's petition for declaratory judgment is dismissed.
Office of Exec. The judgment of the circuit court denying enforcement of an FOIA request directed to the Office of the Executive Secretary is affirmed. Nor did the court err in excluding from evidence certain tax assessment records offered as proof of the value of the decedent's home, or in striking the plaintiff's evidence on a claim for civil conspiracy.
Because an award of attorney's fees to the defendant daughter was based on the ruling in her favor on her motion to strike, that award is vacated. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. This matter is remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion. On the issue of self-defense in determining who was the aggressor or what was the reasonable apprehension of the defendant for his safety, the issue is what the victim probably did, and such evidence is admissible even when the defendant is unaware of it.
Here, however, assuming without deciding that exclusion of certain alleged threats made by the victim against the defendant should have been admitted, such error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence. Where an accused adduces evidence that he acted in self-defense, evidence of specific acts is admissible to show the character of the decedent for turbulence and violence, even if the accused is unaware of such character, but here the trial court did not err in allowing recent episodes while excluding more temporally remote acts of the victim.
Failure to make a timely proffer of conflicting testimony or to make a timely motion for mistrial concerning a comment made by the prosecutor in closing argument foreclose consideration of these matters on appeal. The original complaint sounded wholly in tort and did not state a prima facie cause of action for inverse condemnation. The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the action is remanded for further proceedings in light of this opinion.
To preserve judicial resources and protect unwitting defendants, this habitual filing of meritless appeals is now addressed. Factors considered include a history of 1 filing duplicative, vexatious lawsuits, 2 without any objective good faith basis, and 3 at the expense of the court system and opposing parties. Exercising its inherent power to protect against repetitious and harassing conduct that abuses the judicial process, and to prevent continued filing of frivolous petitions for appeal, this litigant shall be prohibited from filing any petition for appeal, motion, pleading, or other filing without 1 obtaining the services of a practicing Virginia attorney, whose filings would be subject to Code 8.
The Clerk is instructed to comply with this order as it pertains to future filings. In a circumstantial case, the Commonwealth must overcome the presumption of innocence and exclude all reasonable conclusions inconsistent with guilt, which requires an unbroken evidentiary chain of necessary circumstances showing that both the corpus delicti and the criminal agency of the accused have been proved to the exclusion of any other rational hypothesis and to a moral certainty. Here, the totality of the evidence was sufficient for a rational factfinder to reject the defendant's hypothesis that someone else was the criminal agent who placed stolen items in a vehicle linked to him by documentary and testimonial evidence.
As the prevailing party below, the Commonwealth is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences that flow from the evidence. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and final judgment reinstating the convictions is entered on this appeal. While the intent instruction could have been amended to include reference to the defendant's "acts, conduct and statements," where other instructions fully and fairly cover the principles of law governing the case, the trial court does not err in refusing an additional instruction language on the same subject.
In light of the separate instruction regarding jury consideration of the defendant's statements, the instructions, taken as a whole, stated the law clearly and covered all issues fairly raised by the evidence. In this case, the conviction order and the sentencing order were entered in and neither was modified, vacated or suspended within 21 days after their entry.
Accordingly, they became final and the trial court lost jurisdiction to modify the conviction in this case. An oral understanding of the trial court, prosecutor, and defense counsel not embodied in a plea agreement or an order suspending, modifying or vacating the conviction and sentencing orders did not afford jurisdiction to the trial court to enter the relief sought long after the orders were entered. Neither the entry of orders nunc pro tunc nor the doctrine of orders void ab initio applies here.
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the circuit court's disposition is affirmed. Signature on the memoranda by a vice president of the company on the claimant line, crossing out the agent option, did not cause the trustee any prejudice and it was sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the statute. The judgment of the circuit court upholding the liens is affirmed. The record in the case confirms beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational factfinder would have found the defendant guilty absent the claimed error, in light of the limited role that the challenged evidence played at trial, coupled with the overwhelming and unchallenged evidence of defendant's guilt.
Thus, applying the standard for review of alleged constitutional errors, the claimed error of trial court was harmless as a matter of law, and the contrary holding of the Court of Appeals is reversed. Defendant's conviction for possession of heroin with the intent to distribute, third or subsequent offense, is reinstated. There is no time requirement for entry of an order recording the return of an indictment in open court.
The Code of Virginia evinces a clear legislative policy that the requirement of an indictment in the prosecution for a felony may be waived, and hence is not jurisdictional. Thus, failure of the record to show affirmatively that the indictment was returned into court by the grand jury is not such a defect as will render null and void the judgment of conviction based thereon. Defendant was subject to the requirement of Rule 3A:9 b 1 and c to challenge the indictment at least seven days before his trial, which he concedes he did not do. Because he did not argue that there was good cause to excuse this failure as provided in Rule 3A:9 d , he waived the right to object to the indictment.
The present complaint failed to state a cognizable claim, and the circuit court did not err in sustaining the insurer's demurrer. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and this case is remanded for trial. Sea Oats Condo. Nor is it necessary for a party to provide advance notice of the amount of fees it will seek if successful. This statute makes no distinction between compensated and uncompensated sureties, and the right to reimbursement is expressly available to any person liable as a guarantor. Here, if plaintiff made any gift at all it was in his decision to act as an accommodation surety rather than a compensated surety.
The facts here triggered a right to reimbursement under this section, with interest from the time of payment, and five percent damages on such amount, and he is entitled to judgment.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for determination of the amount which is due to the plaintiff under the statute. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in refusing the defendant's proffered jury instruction on carjacking, in light of a model instruction the trial court granted, which fully and accurately covered the carjacking offense. The convictions are affirmed. Thus, it was an abuse of discretion to permit this testimony. However, the defendant doctor's own testimony regarding the circumstances that impacted or would have impacted his decision to perform surgery was not expert opinion but, instead, factual testimony, and its admission was not an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the defendant's own testimony. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. Here, the demarcation of a road as an easement on the plat incorporated into the declaration was sufficient to fulfill the designation requirement for a common area, and the terms of the declaration expressly impose upon the architectural control committee a duty to maintain the road and authorize it to impose assessments for the costs of such maintenance.
Consequently, both the declaration and the committee fulfill the qualifications imposed by the Act. The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the action is remanded. A general restriction on public access is sufficient to rebut the presumption of public access, and once the area has been shown to be restricted, this includes the roads found therein. Thus, the implied consent statute had no applicability and he was not required to submit a breath sample.
Because the plaintiffs failed to allege an actual controversy sufficient to bring a declaratory judgment action, the trial court did not err in finding that none of the plaintiffs have standing, and they likewise may not recover the injunctive relief requested therein. The judgment of the circuit court dismissing the action is affirmed. The judgment is reversed and final judgment is entered.
The circuit court in this case correctly found that the three-year limitation period barred malpractice claims against the first attorney because his work on the particular undertaking at issue had ceased more than three years before plaintiff filed the present malpractice action. It erred in regard to the second defendant, however, since he continued to render services with respect to the undertaking involved until four days after the date a judgment order was actually entered, and the present action was filed three years to the day after that judgment was entered.
The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CSX Transportation, Inc. Here, the amended complaint was sufficient to state facts necessary for application of the last clear chance doctrine, and the fact that the negligence of the decedent in this case continued up to the point of the accident, without more, does not bar the application of the last clear chance doctrine.
That portion of the circuit court's decision finding that the cable service provider was not entitled to recover refunds of taxes for two of the years for failure timely to appeal the decision of the local commissioner of revenue is reversed because that argument was not preserved in arguments before the Tax Commissioner, and thus could not be raised in an appeal thereafter to the circuit court. The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the matter is remanded for completion of the refunds.
In this case, the judgment of the circuit court, which dismissed a petition for writ of certiorari for failure to name the local governing body in the petition and denied the petitioner leave to amend after the day period had expired, is affirmed. This case presents genuine issues of disputed material facts over whether the defendant breached the provisions of the easement thus precluding an award of partial summary judgment.
On the record presented, the disputes center on questions involving the condition of an identified trail area before the defendant conducted what is described as buffer work, the specific nature of the work that the defendant performed in that area, and the use that could be made of the trail after the work was completed. Only after both sides are allowed to fully and fairly present their evidence to a factfinder can those issues be resolved through the application of the plain language of the easement as here construed.
The judgment of the circuit court granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiff is reversed, and this action is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In this case, the plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim was based on alleged retaliation against her for exercise of her statutory right to obtain a protective order against threats of violence by a co-worker, but she did not allege that her termination itself violated the public policy stated in the protective order statutes by somehow endangering her health and safety. No generalized cause of action for the tort of retaliatory discharge has been recognized in Virginia.
There is no public policy violated by the termination of plaintiff's at-will employment and thus she has failed to state a claim under this theory. The judgment dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice is affirmed. United Land Corp. The judgment dismissing the action on statute of limitations grounds is affirmed. The trial court correctly applied Rule , which prohibited plaintiffs from filing two separate lawsuits when one would have been perfectly sufficient.
Because plaintiffs could have joined all three of its claims in a single suit and no qualifying principle of res judicata applies, Rule prohibited them from filing a second suit after losing its first suit on the merits. The judgment dismissing the case on res judicata grounds is affirmed. Since she lacked standing to bring this claim herself, the circuit court did not err in denying leave to amend the complaint to name the bankruptcy trustee as the plaintiff, or to substitute the trustee for the named plaintiff.
The judgment of the circuit court dismissing the action with prejudice is affirmed. Jardines, U. Since the only fact relevant to the retroactivity determination was the date on which the petitioner's conviction became final, which was in the record and uncontested, the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the pure question of law presented by this habeas claim could be resolved solely on the recorded matters and a plenary hearing was unnecessary.
The judgment denying a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed. In Virginia, a Miller violation can be addressed on direct review or in a habeas proceeding. Because the violation, if proven, does not render the sentence void ab initio but merely voidable, it cannot be addressed by a motion to vacate filed years after the sentence became final. The judgment of the circuit court for the plaintiff on a battery theory of liability is reversed. The instructions given reinforced the Commonwealth's burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt, and did not state that willful concealment alone satisfied the burden of proof as to the element of intent.
The instruction used in this case merely created a permissible inference that the jury was free to reject, not a mandatory presumption and, accordingly, the trial court did not err in giving it to the jury. On the whole, the instructions given by the trial court, including the finding instruction, fully and fairly covered the inferences permitted from evidence presented of willful concealment. Nor did the trial court err in excluding a racially charged statement made by the defendant at the scene of the vehicle accident.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Nor was there any error in the trial court's refusal of a proffered jury instruction on the topic of eyewitness identification. While the defendant tendered an instruction relating to eyewitness identification testimony that was a correct statement of the law, other instructions granted in this case were sufficient to inform the jury that it could consider the reliability of the identification of the defendant, and factors noted by the defendant reflect common sense considerations. This decision does not foreclose the use of an appropriate eyewitness identification instruction in a future case, however.
There is no reversible error in the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the convictions, and it is affirmed. Here, the county did not establish an ordinance as required by subsection B. Consequently, it may not rely on subsection I of that statute as a basis to tax the TDRs at issue. While, upon request, the Commonwealth is required to provide indigent defendants with the basic tools of an adequate defense, the constitutional right to the appointment of an expert, at the Commonwealth's expense, is not absolute and an indigent defendant who seeks such an appointment must demonstrate that the assistance of an expert is likely to be a significant factor in the defense, and that the defendant will be prejudiced by the lack of such assistance.
Thus, it cannot be said that a particularized need for the assistance of a neuropsychologist was demonstrated. Market conditions can reduce the value of machinery and tools, and the fact that for a portion of the year the refinery was idled due to adverse market conditions was a relevant consideration in assessing fair market value, but the refinery did not carry its burden of proving that the refinery was overvalued as of January 1 of each of the contested years.
Finally, the county did not assume inconsistent positions in successive litigations, and there was no fatal inconsistency in its appraisals. Thus, the statutory scheme governing habeas corpus jurisdiction does not prohibit the court where the present habeas corpus application has been made from hearing this petition. The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the circuit court had sufficient evidence before it to establish both the causation and criminal negligence elements of the crime, and its judgment is affirmed.
The trial court found as fact that the ring was given as a conditional gift in contemplation of marriage. The marriage did not occur. Consequently, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. In the single-trial setting, the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.
The intent of the legislature is controlling, and it may determine the appropriate unit of prosecution and set the penalty for separate violations. For the reasons explained by the Court of Appeals in its published opinion, 65 Va. In this case, the trial court correctly held that principles of sovereign immunity barred a suit plaintiff filed pursuant to that Act against the Virginia Department of State Police, an arm of the Commonwealth.
The judgment dismissing the suit is affirmed. It also authorized the designation of a new beneficiary for his individual retirement account. The award of attorney's fees is reversed and the judgment is, in all other respects, affirmed. In addition, when indemnification is dependent on performance, a cause of action for failure to indemnify accrues at breach of performance.
Here, while plaintiff claimed no damages until , some injury or damage, however slight, is sufficient for a cause of action to accrue, and it is immaterial that all the resulting damages did not occur at the time of the injury. Because any breach by the subcontractors occurred at that time, the statute of limitations has similarly run against the sureties. The judgment of the circuit court dismissing the actions is affirmed.
The fact that an appellate court had jurisdiction based on a notice of appeal that was filed protectively, does not necessarily divest the trial court of all jurisdiction to act on certain matters. Although the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion on the alternative basis that the defendant had failed to prove manifest injustice, a ruling that was fully supported by evidence in the record.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as right for the wrong reason. In an attempt to defuse the situation and protect himself and his family, defendant retrieved his own gun from another room. When the defendant returned, the victim pointed his gun at defendant who, fearing for his life, shot the victim.
These facts support the defendant's claim that he shot the victim in self-defense. The proposed witnesses would have provided both direct probative evidence on the issues, and proof corroborative of the testimony of the expert witness. The error was not harmless in this case, and the matter is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Services v. While the parties' agreement provided for different caps in separate subsections, the plain language does not contemplate that more than one of these caps would be applicable where, as here, the damages of the party entitled to indemnity all result from the same conduct. The circuit court erred in not limiting the defendants' liability to indemnify the purchaser to damages that escrow cap.
A purchaser must look to the title papers under which he buys, and is charged with notice of all the facts appearing upon their face, or to the knowledge of which anything there appearing will conduct him. A person with notice, actual or constructive, of a defect in his title is not entitled, upon being dispossessed by the rightful owner, to recover compensation for permanent improvements made on the premises, and these principles are applicable on the present facts.
Based upon long-standing common law principles, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed. The evidence failed to prove that certain zero balance credits created liability on the garnishee bank to the judgment debtor. When these balance credits are removed, the sum of the outside deposits is the amount subject to garnishment, and this matter is remanded for determination of these outside deposits to the account, payable to the judgment creditor. Under governing constitutional case law, this statute does not support a public policy Bowman claim for wrongful termination in this case.
The provision is unconstitutional as applied to private consensual sexual activity between adults, and can no longer provide the basis for a valid allegation of wrongful termination whether the employee accedes to the demands or is terminated for refusing the demand. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to show that she was asked to engage in any public sexual activity. The circuit court did not err in finding that no reasonable jurist could find that the peer leader did nothing at all for the decedent's care, and thus there was no question for the jury, and the circuit court properly granted the defense motion for summary judgment.
The judgment of the circuit court against the plaintiff successor landowner is affirmed. Failure to obtain a warrant was not necessary in light of the vehicular exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, because the special district tax is not subject to the partial exemption, the trial court was correct, albeit for the wrong reason, in ruling that the special district tax is not a real estate tax within the meaning and for the purposes of the partial exemption.
Its judgment is therefore affirmed via application of the right result for the wrong reason doctrine. Accordingly, the portion of the April 14, order holding the senators and the Division in contempt is vacated. The portions of the February 16, order that are inconsistent with this opinion are likewise vacated, and the case will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment for plaintiff is reversed and final judgment is entered for the defense.
A trial judge has the power to correct a written statement at any time while it remains in the office of the clerk after notifying counsel and providing an opportunity for a hearing. Thus, as long as a proposed written statement of facts was timely filed and the notice and hearing requirements are satisfied, this correction power allows a trial court to enter a revised version of a timely filed statement of facts.
In this case, the statement of facts signed by the circuit court judge was timely filed in the circuit court and complied with the requirements of Rule 5A:8, and was properly part of the record as an authoritative account of the events that occurred at trial in lieu of a transcript. The Court of Appeals erred by ruling that there was no such statement of facts in the record for its consideration. The award of punitive damages is reversed in this case, the judgment is affirmed in part, and final judgment is entered for the plaintiff on the remainder of the circuit court's award.
A two-year convalescence period is available to injured service members in applying for reinstatement to a former civilian position. However, Sections and of the Act afford returning service members protection only during the act of rehiring. Because there is no dispute in this case that the defendant Sheriff promptly rehired the plaintiff as a deputy upon her return from military deployment, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to the Sheriff.
Title 38 U. No claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act is involved in this appeal. The judgment dismissing claims against the defendant Sheriff is affirmed.soilstones.com/wp-content/2020-07-13/75.php
Supreme Court of Virginia Opinions
The petitioner had no federal constitutional right to counsel in his probation revocation hearing and, under United States Supreme Court case law, he could not meet the requirements of review regarding a due process right to counsel because he admitted violating his probation by committing new crimes and did not otherwise contest revocation, and he did not present any circumstances mitigating or justifying the violation.
Thus, his probation revocation hearing was not one in which fundamental fairness gave rise to a due process constitutional right to counsel. Therefore, petitioner could not have been denied the effective assistance of that counsel. Because the habeas court erred in ruling otherwise, the judgment granting the petitioner a delayed appeal is reversed.
Therefore, the decision of the Commission is affirmed. Nor is the record sufficient to convict the defendant of this offense as a principal in the second degree. Thus, the rationale used by the Court of Appeals to affirm his convictions for assault and battery of a law enforcement officer and obstruction of justice is not valid. The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and final judgment is entered. The other encompassed offense, addressed in its second prong, requires a specific intent, but the crime of credit card theft under the first prong of the statute is completed when the credit card or number is unlawfully taken from its rightful owner.
This is a general intent crime completed upon an unlawful taking and does not require that the Commonwealth allege or prove the specific intent required to support a conviction under the second prong of the statute. The judgment upholding the conviction on this charge is affirmed. No election official in the Commonwealth may enforce them. The Secretary of the Commonwealth, the State Board of Elections, the Virginia Department of Elections, and their employees, agents, chairpersons, and commissioners, are ordered to take specified actions to satisfy their duties to ensure that only qualified voters are registered to vote.
The requested writ of mandamus is issued to that effect; a writ of prohibition is denied. Prejudice to the Commonwealth is a relevant factor that should be considered when reviewing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, and in this case it cannot be said that the trial court erred by weighing the equities and considering the resulting prejudice to the Commonwealth due to the lengthy delay between the defendant's entry of his guilty plea and his motion to withdraw that plea.
Nor can it be said that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the prejudice to the Commonwealth outweighed any equities that favored granting the motion. Further, the defendant did not demonstrate an immediate, real threat to his safety, and thus did not have a defense of necessity to a charge of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, upholding the judgment of the circuit court, is affirmed.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed on the grounds explained here. Nor was the royalty owed if the sublicensees used this technology at an off-site location. Both provided concurrent primary liability coverage and, as a result, the judgment is reversed in part and affirmed in part. The case is remanded for the circuit court to determine the appropriate pro rata contributions from each insurance source to the costs of defense and indemnification associated with settlement of the underlying liability suit.
The provision, known as a possibility of reverter at common law, lawfully vested the beneficiary of that interest with the reversionary interest. The case is remanded for entry of a final order consistent with this opinion, to be filed in the land records, and the circuit court may in its discretion make an additional award of fiduciary compensation. In the de novo appeal, the circuit court likewise lacked subject matter jurisdiction, because its subject matter jurisdiction was derived from and limited to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court from which the appeal was taken.
The judgment of the circuit court is vacated, thereby restoring each of the parties to their status prior to the commencement of the unlawful detainer proceeding. Thus, the decision of the trial court to grant a motion to dismiss on this ground is reversed. The trial court also erred in denying motions in limine with regard to the separate value of the coal reserves on the property, as well as a surface mine that was not contemplated at the time of the taking.
However, considering the the unity of lands doctrine, the court did not err in denying a motion in limine with regard to evidence of the devaluation of the neighboring tracts owned by the landowner that were not part of the take because here, there is evidence from which a jury could find a unity of use. The judgment is affirmed in part, and reversed in part, and the matter is remanded. State Industries, Inc.
The judgment in favor of the defendant is affirmed. Petitioner demonstrated that he had a strong desire to wish to maintain his immigration status and remain in this country, and a basis for doing so, and that he conveyed this position to his defense attorney prior to accepting the plea agreement. The evidence further supported a finding that a fact-finder could have found him not guilty of the hit and run offense. The record therefore supports the judgment of the trial court that a decision to reject the plea agreement and proceed to trial would have been rational.
The judgment of the habeas court is thus not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it and, accordingly, is affirmed. While difficult to establish, the specific agreement between a testator client and an attorney concerning the drafting of a will could identify an intended third-party beneficiary. The judgment for plaintiff is affirmed. The judgment overturning the result of the grievance procedure is reversed and final judgment is entered for the grievant. The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia upholding the conviction is affirmed. The judgment sustaining a demurrer to the complaint of a former employee is affirmed.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and final judgment is entered in accordance with the jury verdict and sentencing order. Her contract with the developers provided that she would receive a particular subdivision lot, but years later it was sold to a builder. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy available under specific conditions and when legal remedies, such as monetary damages, would be insufficient. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it imposed a constructive trust upon the remaining subdivision lot of the developers, in which a bank had a secured interest.
The judgment is reversed in part and final judgment is entered. The statute provides that all real property used for open or common space shall be construed as having no value in itself for assessment purposes. Its only value lies in the value that is attached to the residential or commercial property which has a right by easement, covenant, deed or other interest. The common area is not exempt from taxation but the statute sets the value for assessment purposes as the value the common area provides to the dominant estate i.
This is not the value of the fee of the common area itself, but the value by which access to and use of the common area augments the value of the lots. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, the assessments are vacated, and final judgment is entered for the association. Applying the four-factor test recognized in Virginia case law, focusing on the state interests and control of the activities of the defendant and her exercise of judgment and discretion in rendering nursing care to the plaintiff, the facts of the present case, in light of legislation enacted by the General Assembly, demonstrate that it was not error to sustain the plea.
For the reasons set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Virginia in this case, Wallace v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. The condemnation of additional land by the city was not governed by the subdivision plat note waiver, but the landowner failed to present any evidence damages could be apportioned and thus the entire judgment is reversed. On the evidence, the defendant cannot be found liable for breach of contract and the trial court erred in not striking the evidence on that theory. Nor did the defendant disclose or use the trade secrets in violation of the Trade Secrets Act, and nothing in the nondisclosure agreement or that Act required the defendant to use plaintiffs as subcontractors.
The rules of contract law do not apply to the teaming agreement because it is merely an agreement to agree to negotiate at a future date, and accordingly plaintiffs are not entitled to damages for breach of the teaming agreement. The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and final judgment is entered with respect to certain claims. There is no such language in these deeds. Aireco Supply, Inc. The judgment is reversed, and the action is remanded. The limitations period on those claims began to run at that point and expired two years later on her birthday in March The judgment is reversed and final judgment is entered in favor of the sanctioned attorneys.
There is no basis for declaring the multiple term-of-years sentences imposed to be cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. Nothing in governing constitutional case law dictates that multiple sentences involving multiple crimes be treated, for Eighth Amendment purposes, in exactly the same manner as a single life-without-parole sentence for a single crime. Doing so would require extension of the categorical rule of case law far beyond any binding precedent, embracing a wholly new doctrine that is constitutionally unnecessary and jurisprudentially imprudent.
The Court of Appeals did not err in denying their petitions for appeal, and the judgments are affirmed. The circuit court is directed to reconsider the petition after making findings on disputed allegations of material facts. The Commonwealth may obtain an indictment from the grand jury charging an offense for which the district court has previously found no probable cause, and the indictment against this defendant was not amended.
There is no factual support for the contention that defendant was denied his right to represent himself at trial. He had multiple opportunities to raise his right to self-representation and, when the case came on for trial, he was asked whether he wished to represent himself at trial, he informed the judge that he did not. Although the defendant argues the Commonwealth did not establish due diligence in obtaining its evidence for trial, he fails to allege any harm to him resulting from a two-week continuance that was granted.
Gordon Assocs. The judgment finding the design engineers liable under the engineering contract for breach of the applicable engineering standard of care is also affirmed. Because the record also supports the finding that the agreements did not transfer liability for design defects to the construction contractor that built the rain tank structure in accord with the plans, and that the defective plans were the sole proximate cause of its collapse, the circuit court did not err in finding that the contractor was entitled to be paid for removal of the collapsed tank and installation of a replacement system, or in passing the liability for paying the contractor on to the engineers.
The award of damages in the form of extended construction loan interest which was not incurred by the church as a result of the breach of contract is reversed, and that amount will be deducted from the judgment. The judgment is reversed. Certified Question 1 , alternative a is answered in the affirmative by the holding that the executive order constitutes a partial pardon.
Certified Question 2 is answered in the affirmative: the actions taken by the Governor of Virginia in the executive order are valid under the Virginia State Constitution. The original complaint identified the correct defendant involved in a traffic accident, but used an incorrect last name in naming her, a misnomer. Here, the plaintiff filed the present complaint within that six-month period and correctly named the defendant. The matter is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Because federal law prohibits the making of a golden parachute payment under the circumstances presented in this case, that section of the employment agreement in this case is void and unenforceable.
Furthermore, the former executive may not collaterally attack the prohibition as an unconstitutional taking without just compensation, because the validity of the law rendering performance impossible does not affect the validity of the defense, provided the promisor relies upon the law in good faith, and nothing in the record suggests that the bank refused to make the golden parachute payment to plaintiff in bad faith.
Considering the pleadings and documents brought before the circuit court for consideration on the demurrer by craving oyer, the plaintiff failed to show that it was situated similarly to another land owner which was granted an extension on its conditional use permit for a sign under county ordinances. Nor did plaintiff demonstrate that granting an extension of its permit was in the public interest.
The judgment of the circuit court granting a demurrer and dismissing this action with prejudice is affirmed. Lambert Coal Co. The other defendant in this case admitted that it had guaranteed payment in full of the deferred purchase price. The circuit court correctly concluded that there was no material fact in dispute and summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on its contract claim was appropriate.
The circuit court also did not err in denying a continuance on the pending summary judgment motion based on discovery requests the defendants filed only five days before the hearing. Judgment for plaintiff is affirmed. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in allowing her claim for timber trespass to go the jury. An applicant who has been convicted of a felony prior to his or her application cannot fulfill this statutory condition precedent, and is not eligible to be hired. The statute is not ambiguous, and there is no inconsistency between this section and other Code provisions relating to school boards and teacher hiring, termination, or licensure by the Board of Education.
Because of a prior conviction, the teacher in this case could not fulfill the statutory condition precedent to employment and the school board lacked authority to hire her, or to make a continuing contract with her the following year. The continuing contract therefore is ultra vires and void ab initio. There was no showing that the teacher reasonably relied on representations of the board to her detriment and, since the contract was void ab initio, it cannot form the basis for a claim of estoppel.
Nor did a conditional use permit and state regulations mandate that plaintiff place the required amount of top soil on the property prior to closing, since there never was such a warranty in this case and, even if there had been, it could not have been violated prior to closing. Nor can an anti-merger clause, absent express language stating otherwise, extend a contractual warranty beyond the closing date that, by its very terms, has no post-closing applicability.
The judgment for the defendant on its counterclaim is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The sentencing orders were final, appealable orders under Virginia law and no precedent recognizes a Sixth Amendment right to counsel to pursue a motion to reconsider a sentence after the entry of final judgment. The writ of habeas corpus, therefore, was properly issued for these reasons, and the judgment is affirmed. Petitioner was required to prove his claim that defense counsel disregarded instructions to prosecute an appeal.
While petitioner argues that the evidence contained ambiguities or inconsistencies on the issue of whether such instructions were provided, here there was credible evidence to support the finding by the habeas court that no such instructions were given, and it cannot be said that the circuit court's finding was plainly wrong or unsupported by credible evidence.
A sanction can protect litigants from the assertions of unfounded factual and legal claims and against the assertions of valid claims for improper purposes. Sanctions can also be used to protect courts against those who would abuse the judicial process. The judgment awarding sanctions is affirmed. The Commonwealth need not present medical testimony to prove bodily injury resulting from strangulation; however, if the Commonwealth presents evidence sufficient to prove that unlawful pressure to the neck was applied to a victim and that it resulted in unconsciousness, this is sufficient to prove the element of bodily injury.
Proof of some form of bodily injury is required to support conviction under this statute. The judgments are affirmed. This bright-line rule is not limited to cases in which the prior sentence was imposed by a jury, and applies equally to sentences imposed by a judge. The case is remanded for re-sentencing in accord with this opinion. Thus, a retired worker whose work-related injury causes total incapacity need not produce evidence of a pre-injury intent to reenter the workforce.
In this case, the deputy commissioner correctly found that the claimant was totally disabled and that he lacked all earning capacity and, therefore, he is entitled to temporary total disability compensation. Therefore, petitioner was not unlawfully detained because of that Virginia conviction, at the time he filed his habeas petition. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the petition for want of jurisdiction must be affirmed. The misdemeanor charge was part and parcel of the same incident and the same alleged course of criminal conduct as the charged murder and attempted murder.
All three charges required proof of the same issue of ultimate fact: that the defendant fired a weapon at a vehicle in a parking lot outside a nightclub on a specific evening. Upon the entry of a final judgment of acquittal on the misdemeanor, the Commonwealth was precluded from trying the defendant on any other charge for which that specific fact was necessary to prove as an element of the crime. In this case when the Commonwealth obtained felony convictions that relied on that specific fact, it put this defendant twice in jeopardy for the same offense and violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgments of conviction and dismissing the felony indictments is affirmed. The judgment is reversed and final judgment is entered ordering the payment of the awards to the personal representatives. The evidence adduced at trial by the Commonwealth in this case was insufficient to prove that that the contractor received a statutorily compliant letter demanding a return of the advance of money he had previously received from the homeowner. The conviction is reversed.
The attorney had informed petitioner that he was not an immigration attorney and advised her to consult one, but his deportation advice was correct regardless of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of her presence in the United States. The judgment of the circuit court denying the application for a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed. Selective Insurance Co. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Hence, a demurrer should have been granted. The judgment is reversed and final judgment entered in favor of the insurer.
It also erred in excluding evidence of prior rulings in the contempt proceeding relevant to the issue of bad faith in the present contract action. Chicago Title Insurance Co. Because the former wife made no affirmative, inconsistent representation to the divorce court, judicial estoppel is inapplicable as a matter of law in this case. The judgment declaring that the lender holds a valid first deed of trust lien against the entire fee simple interest of both former spouses is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and, with respect to several documents, the matter is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. Defense counsel's questioning of a police witness about tips implicating other individuals did not "open the door" to substantive use of the tip regarding this defendant.
The error in permitting this proof was not harmless under non-constitutional principles. Upon review of the entire record, it cannot be said with fair assurance that the jury was not substantially influenced by the erroneous admission into evidence of the substance of the tip implicating the defendant. That part of the Court of Appeals' judgment reversing the convictions and remanding the case for retrial if the Commonwealth be so advised is affirmed. Rule 5A:3 d provides that any document required to be filed with the clerk of the Court shall be deemed to be timely filed if 1 it is transmitted expense pre-paid to the clerk of this Court by a third-party commercial carrier for next-day delivery, and 2 if the official receipt therefor be exhibited upon demand of the clerk or any party and it shows such transmission or mailing within the prescribed time limits.
Thus, the petition for review in this case was timely filed with the Court of Appeals. The judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition as untimely is reversed and the matter is remanded for a decision on the merits of the petition for review. However, these implied-in-fact contracts did not include terms and conditions permitting the management company to withdraw premature termination fees or copying charges from the operating accounts.
The judgment below is reversed and the litigation is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The easement never moved from the mean high water mark as it existed in The beach has eroded in the meantime, and the land where the easement was once located is now under the Chesapeake Bay and cannot serve as a road. Thus, the express easement created by the deed has been extinguished. The judgment of the circuit court finding that the plaintiff landowners have a variable express easement that moves with the mean high water line is reversed, and final judgment is entered on this appeal in favor of the defendants.
It is also held that a deed of trust recorded outside a lien creditor's chain of title is not "duly admitted to record," and therefore is void as to such lien creditor. The judgment is reversed and final judgment is entered for the authority. When reasonably fair-minded persons may differ as to the conclusions of fact to be drawn from the evidence, or if the conclusion is dependent upon the weight to be given the testimony, then such evidence is controverted, and the jury's verdict cannot be disturbed either by the circuit court or this Court.